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Uncertainty in bidding for Product-Service Systems: The influence of 
competition on decision making 
Abstract: 
This research investigates what impact the existence of competition has on the 
pricing decision for Product-Service Systems (PSS) under uncertainty. PSS 
provision is an increasingly important area for many businesses and competition 
increases cognitive pressures on providers even further. We present an empirical 
study with industrial experts from the defence and aerospace sector, in cost 
estimation and bidding. The study consisted of an experimental set-up via two 
questionnaires which differed in the existence of competition in the bidding 
scenario. The findings showed that bidding decision makers changed their 
evaluation of the cost estimate due to the introduction of competition but kept 
their evaluations of the profit margin and price bids constant. Furthermore, the 
participants listed the relevant sources of uncertainty that influenced their 
decision-making process. This research contributes to the literature in two ways. 
First, our findings showed that predictions from current theory regarding 
decision-making of cost estimation and pricing are not confirmed when 
competitively bidding for PSS. Second, we show uncertainty sources that 
influenced the decision makers and identified p the importance of internal 
processes of the PSS provider and environmental uncertainty. 
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1. Introduction 
Manufacturing companies increasingly adopt a servitization strategy, where services 
and products are integrated into Product-Service Systems (PSS) to add value for the 
customer (Vandermerwe and Rada 1988, Hawkins et al. 2015, Lacoste and Johnsen 
2015). Examples are the ten year engine support contract for the Eurofighter Typhoon 
which is valued at £865 million (Defense Industry Daily 2011) and the Australian 
Anzac Support Contract where military surface ships will be serviced for an initial 
period of five years (Babcock 2012). PSS offer many advantages for providers such as 
increased profits, stability in cash flow and increased customer demand through lock-in 
situations (Wise and Baumgartner 1999). However, in practice, many of these 
advantages are not realised as only 21% of companies succeed with their PSS business 
(Baveja et al. 2004). In line with these observations, Rapaccini (2015) reports that PSS 
providers frequently under-price their offerings and overpromise regarding their 
performance because of the operational novelty and complexity of PSS for their 
business. Thus, many servitized manufacturers fail to make suitable pricing decisions 
for their PSS offerings. 
PSS contracts are typically allocated through competitive bidding against other 
leading suppliers in the market (Kleemann and Essig 2013, Kreye et al. 2013) which 
creates various challenges for the provider’s decision maker in determining a suitable 
price bid. On the one hand, decision makers may be encouraged to set a high price value 
because of the high operational uncertainty of PSS to ensure future profitability 
(Benedettini et al. 2015). On the other hand, the existence of competition can motivate 
decision makers to reduce the price bid (Feng et al. 2015, Rapaccini 2015) leading to an 
under-pricing of the PSS offering. In addition, services are heterogeneous which means 
different providers offer different quality levels (Fisk et al. 1993) and makes offers 
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between competitors less comparable. Furthermore, PSS are typically long-term 
arrangements in comparison to product sales. PSS can span, for example, five years or 
longer (Kreye et al. 2015) which reduces the ability to accurately forecast the cost 
because of increasing uncertainty of longer time horizons (Goodwin and Wright 1993). 
Thus, PSS providers face high levels of uncertainty in their pricing decisions (Ottesen 
and Grønhaug 2002, Selviaridis and Spring 2010). 
In current practice, pricing decisions rely on the decision makers’ judgment of 
the available information based on their intuition and experience to identify a suitable 
bid (Pemer et al. 2014). High levels of uncertainty negatively impact the ability of 
decision makers to rely on their judgment as highlighted by psychology research 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974, Ottesen and Grønhaug 2002). Many studies describe that 
decision makers ignore or underestimate uncertainty which means they are 
overconfident in their decisions (Tversky and Kahneman 1974, Zotteri and 
Kalchschmidt 2007). For example Langer & Roth (1975) found that decision makers 
can feel more confident in predicting the future outcome of a throw of coins when past 
predictions have been correct. In other situations, uncertainty can be overestimated 
(Harvey 2001). Thus, it is the decision maker’s perception of uncertainty that 
determines pricing decisions; however, the current servitization literature offers limited 
insights regarding this issue. 
To address this challenge, this paper aims to investigate the following research 
question (RQ): What impact does the existence of competition have on the providers’ 
pricing decision for PSS under uncertainty? To answer this RQ, an empirical study is 
introduced to investigate the decision maker’s reaction to a bidding scenario with and 
without the existence of competition. This empirical study followed an experimental 
design and was undertaken with industrial costing and bidding experts, mainly from the 
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defence and aerospace industry. Our research contributes to the servitization and PSS 
literature in two ways. First, our findings investigate decision-making at the competitive 
bidding stage for PSS provision and show that predictions from current theory are not 
confirmed within the context of PSS. Second, we show relevant uncertainty sources that 
influence the decision making and identify two sources that have thus far received 
limited attention: namely the internal processes of the PSS provider and customer 
related uncertainty.  
2. Background 
This section reviews the literature on PSS, pricing strategies for PSS and uncertainty in 
competitive bidding for PSS.  
2.1 Product-Service Systems 
Product-Service Systems integrate elements of product and service offerings so that the 
individual product or service part of the system cannot be distinguished anymore 
(Tukker 2004, Kreye 2016). For example, for the delivery of an output-focused PSS for 
a fleet of aircraft, the provider may exchange the physical aircraft (or parts of it) to 
guarantee availability and undertake necessary, maintenance activities away from the 
customer site. The aircraft becomes part of the service bundle which creates an 
integrated offering to deliver customer value (Wise and Baumgartner 1999). Thus, PSS 
have specific characteristics that distinguish them from individual product and service 
offerings. Specifically, the following three characteristics are important for the focus of 
this research. 
First, PSS are not homogeneous, similar to many services. This means that 
offerings differ depending on the provider and customer involved in the arrangement 
(Fisk et al. 1993, Lacoste and Johnsen 2015, Kreye 2017). The specific PSS offering 
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depends on the provider’s capabilities including the technology and knowledge they 
have available (Oliva and Kallenberg 2003) and on the customer capability including 
their capability to provide the relevant information and access (Hawkins et al. 2015). 
Second, PSS offerings have typically high operational complexity which differs 
between specific offerings (Kreye et al. 2015). In this context, complexity can be 
defined as the number of independent tasks necessary to deliver the service (Shostack 
1987, Skaggs and Youndt 2004). For example, the maintenance of a product or similar 
after-sales services require less complexity than performance-based services. Thus, PSS 
offerings require more developed and mature operational processes and delivery 
systems. Third, PSS are long-lived because many of the supported pieces of equipment 
have long life expectancies – often spanning multiple decades. Similarly, the PSS 
arrangements for these pieces of equipment are also long-term in nature. Typical 
contract lengths in the defence and aerospace industry are five-year contracts (Kreye et 
al. 2012). This creates difficulties with regard to forecasting as future costs (Settanni et 
al. 2014) may depend on future market developments, customer’s future needs and use 
rates as well as the provider’s future capabilities (Goh et al. 2010).  
These characteristics create specific challenges for the pricing of PSS, 
specifically in competitive-bidding settings. PSS offerings are difficult to compare 
between different providers due to their non-homogeneous nature. Further, customers 
and providers may find it difficult to realistically evaluate the PSS offerings on the 
market because of the highly-complex nature of the involved operations. Finally, 
providers face high levels of uncertainty connected to forecasting the cost and 
operational need of providing a PSS, which has impact on their decision making. Thus, 
developing a suitable pricing strategy is a core challenge of PSS providers. 
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2.2 Pricing of PSS in competitive bidding 
Much of the literature on competitive bidding focuses on non-integrated product or 
service offerings and aims typically at determining optimal bidding strategies (Puro et 
al. 2011, Cai et al. 2012). As described above, PSS differ from products with regard to 
heterogeneity of offerings between competitors, operational complexity and the long 
contract durations which has important implications for the pricing of these offerings. 
PSS prices should be determined based on the value they deliver to the customer (Oliva 
and Kallenberg 2003). However, this value is difficult for the provider to determine and 
quantify. They create the challenge of comparison between different providers where 
multiple attributes apart from service price need to be considered (Ellram and Tate 
2015, Hawkins et al. 2015). These attributes depend on the specific context and can 
include physical facilities (Ballesteros-Pérez et al. 2016), staff skills and empathy 
(Parasuraman et al. 1988) and other providers’ capabilities. As a result, much of the 
literature in competitive bidding has focused on service of low complexity which can be 
compared between providers. Examples here are transport services (Berling and Eng-
Larsson 2016), hotel services (Ballesteros-Pérez et al. 2016) and restaurants (Arenoe et 
al. 2015). Thus, existing approaches have limited applicability for PSS which are highly 
complex and long-lived. 
2.3 Uncertainty in pricing PSS 
High levels of uncertainty can influence the pricing of PSS. This uncertainty can arise 
from various sources and thus impact the decision-making process (Kreye et al. 2014). 
These sources include the bidding context, internal processes and customer relationship. 
Table 1 summarises these different uncertainty sources and explains their relevance for 
the research presented in this paper. The literature has paid much effort on researching 
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the impact of the bidding context (Schoenherr and Mabert 2008, Cai et al. 2009, Li and 
Graves 2012), the organizational processes for providing the PSS (Baines and Lightfoot 
2014, Kreye et al. 2015) and the impact of customer relations on the bidding process 
(Guo et al. 2009, Chaneton and Vulcano 2011, Sošić 2011). In contrast, the impact of 
the existence of competition when bidding for PSS has been under-researched in the 
literature. This is therefore the focus of our research. 
<Please include Table 1 about here> 
3. Expectations and hypothesis development 
This section will outline the expectations of our empirical observations regarding the 
impact of competition on pricing decision making. Rapaccini (2015) found that in 
practice many servitized manufacturers use a cost-based approach for pricing their PSS 
offerings. The reason for their observation may be found in the product-focused 
tradition of their businesses. We will thus focus our investigations on cost-based pricing 
due to the frequent use in practice. As such, our investigations will focus on four main 
elements: the cost estimate for fulfilling the PSS requirement, the desired profit margin, 
the first price bid (from which negotiations with the customer could start) and the 
minimum price bid (below which the provider will not accept the contract). The 
investigated independent variable is the existence of competition. Figure 1 depicts the 
research design. 
<Please include Figure 1 about here> 
As described above, the introduction of competition to a bidding scenario adds further 
uncertainty. Yet, a cost estimate is typically based on operational considerations for 
fulfilling the PSS requirements (Goh et al. 2010). It thus includes a level of uncertainty 
relevant for the cost estimate such as cost of spare parts, assumptions about staff times 
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and equipment wear out (Kreye et al. 2012). We therefore do not expect to see a 
difference in the decision maker’s choice of cost estimate based on the introduction of 
competition to a bidding scenario. We state the following hypothesis: 
H1: The chosen cost estimate is not influenced by the existence of competition 
when bidding for the provision of PSS. 
The additional uncertainty introduced through competition may influence the decision 
maker’s consideration regarding the desired profit margin and the price bids. The 
introduction of competition may cause the decision maker to evaluate the likely price 
bids of competitors (Ballesteros-Pérez et al. 2016) and hence adjust their own 
expectations of achievable profit margins. Specifically we would expect increased 
pressures for providers who in turn reduce their profit margins and reduced first price 
bid (Stark and Rothkopf 1979). We thus state the following hypotheses: 
H2: Decision makers reduce their stated profit margins when competition is 
introduced to a bidding scenario for PSS provision.  
H3: Decision makers reduce their initial price bids when competition is 
introduced to a bidding scenario for PSS provision. 
Finally, we expect that the minimum price bid remains unchanged due to the 
introduction of competition. The reason for this expectation is that a minimum price bid 
is often based on the lowest acceptable profit (Kreye et al. 2012). The decision maker 
will orient themselves on the cost estimate (i.e. hypothesis 1). We can thus formulate 
the following hypothesis. 
H4: Decision makers do not reduce the minimum price bid they find acceptable 
for providing PSS when competition is introduced to a bidding scenario for 
PSS provision. 
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4. Method 
To answer our RQ, an empirical study was designed following an experimental set-up 
using questionnaires. This was deemed suitable for this research due to two reasons. 
First, for the purpose of this research we needed a data collection method that required a 
minimal level of interaction between the researcher and the participants. This minimised 
the influence of bias and preconception, offered the ability to determine the participants’ 
attitudes and beliefs (Teddlie and Tashakkori 2009). Second, we needed to address a 
larger set of participants to enable comparison between the different attitudes and 
responses of decision makers. This supported generalizability of the findings across 
organisations and industrial sectors. 
4.1 Research design 
The unit of analysis for this research is the individual decision maker. To enable a 
comparison between different bidding scenarios, a two-step research design was used. 
As such, the study consisted of two individual questionnaires which were administered 
on paper. Both questionnaires contained a PSS bidding scenario and included a 
qualitative description of the decision problem and a graphical display of the cost 
forecast as shown in Figure 2. The general bidding scenario was the same in both 
questionnaires: the participants were in the situation of bidding for a 5-year service 
contract for one of the company’s lathes. This general bidding scenario was chosen for 
the following reasons. The characteristics of a lathe could be expected to be known to 
the participants in enough detail due to their engineering background. Further, the study 
participants did not operate in the lathe industry which meant that none of the 
participants had specific in-depth knowledge about the business conditions and 
technical details. Thus, we can assume a similar level of background knowledge which 
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reduces the influence of bias and makes the responses comparable between participants. 
The graphical display of the cost forecast was chosen as a fan diagram as this was 
described in the literature to be easily understandable and support decision makers’ 
interpretation of the data as well as make them aware of the influence of uncertainty on 
their decision (Kreye et al. 2012). To support this understanding a description of the 
general meaning of the graph was given with the scenario to explain the labelling and 
graph meaning. The text of the further description is included in the Appendix A. 
<Please include Figure 2 about here> 
4.2 Questionnaire design 
In both questionnaires, the general bidding scenario focused on an open tender similar 
to industrial standards familiar to the study participants. The two questionnaires differed 
as follows. The first questionnaire (Scenario “no explicit competition”) utilized terms 
such as “negotiate” and “tender” in order not to bias the participants. The existence of 
competition was neither mentioned in nor excluded from the scenario. The reason for 
this methodological choice was to not bias the participants towards competition-based 
pricing (Rapaccini 2015). If the existence of competition is known in a bidding 
scenario, pricing decisions are often simplified because decision makers may orient 
themselves on the expectations of competitor bids (Ballesteros-Pérez et al. 2016). Thus, 
the mentioning of competition – also in a statement highlighting the lack of competition 
– can bias decision making and thus limit the insights with regard to our research 
question. Thus, the term competition was not utilised in the first questionnaire to limit 
the influence of bias on the decision outcomes. This assumption was left to the 
participant to make. Other assumptions the participants had to make were about the 
bidding strategy of the customer, their budget limits, preferences or beliefs.  
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The second questionnaire (Scenario “explicit competition”) explicitly mentioned 
the existence of competition. It was assumed that the competitors had access to the same 
cost information as the participant and had sufficient knowledge about the processes of 
maintaining the lathes. Uncertainties influencing the decision were exemplified as the 
bidding strategy of the opponents, the price bids of the competitors and their overall 
service budget. Questionnaire 2 also contained an additional scenario where the 
customer requested a further reduction of the price bid. The participants were asked to 
respond to this request and give their reasoning for their response. This additional 
scenario was exploratory in nature to study the possibility of changing the bidding 
strategy of the decision maker when facing a more specified negotiation with the 
customer. 
The two questionnaires were handed out with a time difference. This allowed 
studying the effect of the changed scenario and limiting the influence of memory from 
answering the “no explicit competition” scenario. A further advantage was that it kept 
the participants in the same decision context reducing the influence of other factors such 
as a change of emotions (Schwarz 2000), stress levels (Cannon-Bowers 1998) or the 
decision context (Adair 1984, Robson 2011). The empirical study was undertaken at a 
one-day industrial conference on cost forecasting. The “no explicit competition” 
questionnaire was handed out and collected early in the morning and the “competition” 
one in the afternoon. In between the questionnaires the participants were engaged in 
intellectual activities including presentations on costing practices in industry and 
informal discussions on current issues in the field. The time difference was chosen to be 
a long enough for the participants to forget the details such as wording of their previous 
answers (Cooke et al. 2002) and short enough to not change the overall decision 
situation.  
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The questions focused on the cost-based pricing approach as a suitable method 
for PSS (Rapaccini 2015) and investigated the cost estimate, the profit margin, the first 
and the minimum price bid. In addition to these evaluations, the participants were asked 
to give reasons for their choices and verbal evaluations of the bidding scenario. These 
were phrased as open questions to encourage unbiased verbal answers. This approach 
enabled the researchers to gather quantitative information to test the research 
hypotheses while also enabling to capture the participants’ qualitative reasoning and 
thought processes. Finally, the participants were asked to list the risks or uncertainties 
that they found important for their decision making. Both terms were used 
interchangeably here to account for the close link in industrial understanding (Kreye et 
al. 2013). 
4.3 Participants 
The study was carried out at a conference of the Society for Cost Analysis and 
Forecasting (SCAF) and a conference of the Association of Cost Engineers (ACostE), 
both situated in the UK (ACostE 2012, SCAF 2012). The all-day conferences were 
attended by costing and bidding experts from the defence and aerospace sector and were 
thus acquainted with the concept of PSS and competitive bidding. The participants were 
predominantly male and were decision makers with more than five years of experience 
in the field and in costing and pricing. Furthermore, most participants were employees 
of large and international organisations. We applied the self-selection volunteer 
sampling as suitable approach where each individual participant could choose 
individually if they wanted to participate in this study (Saunders et al. 2012). This 
approach was deemed suitable for the purpose of our study for the following reasons. It 
allowed the participants to evaluate their desire to respond to the questionnaires 
(Saunders et al. 2012). They were thus not put under stress or pressure which could 
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have biased the responses. We ensured high response rates by handing physical copies 
of the questionnaires out at the conferences that were attended by persons with relevant 
background knowledge in costing and pricing. The total number of returned 
questionnaires was 39 for the “no explicit competition” scenario and 32 for the 
“competition” scenario out of which 28 were traceable, i.e. the results of both scenarios 
could be compared.  
When answering the questionnaires, the participants worked separately without 
communicating with each other, which was ensured through supervision by the 
researchers and the conference organisers. The participants were asked about their 
experience with a fan diagram as a graph to display uncertain forecasting information. 
The responses indicated that 54% had seen a diagram like the one presented before, 
43% had not and 3% did not give an answer. Further, the participants were asked to 
state the interpretation of a fan diagram in their own words. This ensured that they 
understood the diagram as a basis for decision making. The responses suggest that most 
respondents (82.1%) related it to the concept of uncertainty as defined in this research. 
The remaining participants did either give no response or indicated a different 
interpretation. The answers suggest that the study participants understood the purpose of 
the fan diagram, could interpret and describe it in their own words. The fan diagram was 
thus deemed a suitable approach to displaying information for the purpose of this study. 
4.4 Data analysis 
The responses were analysed using a mixed-method approach. The comparison of the 
decision outcome with regard to cost estimate, profit margin and price bids were 
analysed quantitatively via statistical analysis using a t-test. The t-test has been 
highlighted as being suitable for sample sizes smaller than 30 (Lapin 1987, p. 365) and 
is thus suitable for the number of responses of this study. The t-test was used to 
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compare the mean values of the two samples (i.e. comparing responses to 
Questionnaires 1 and 2). Furthermore, we applied qualitative data analysis to the open 
questions such as the influencing factors for setting the minimum price and 
risks/uncertainties influencing the participants’ responses. These were initially coded 
based on the researchers’ understanding and interpretation of the data and subsequently 
combined to identify emerging themes through systematic combining (Dubois and 
Gadde 2002). 
5. Findings 
This section presents the findings with regard to the chosen cost estimates, profit 
margins, pricing decisions, uncertainty factors and additional reduction of the price bid. 
Table 1 outlines the basic statistics of the main responses with regard to the cost 
estimate, profit margin and the first and minimum price bids.  
<Please insert Table 2 about here> 
5.1 Cost estimates 
Most respondents gave their cost estimate in the form of a percentage line within the 
given fan diagram; only five respondents gave absolute cost values. The findings 
showed that the chosen cost estimates moved closer to the medium value of the forecast 
range (i.e. the 50% mark) with the introduction of competition. Eleven participants 
(39.3%) reduced their cost estimate when competition was introduced to the scenario. 
This is an unexpected outcome as the costs are usually not lower due to competitors 
offering the same service. On the other hand, 16 participants (57.1%) did not change 
their cost estimate but chose the same (point) forecast. In general, the stated cost 
estimates with the introduction of competition were lower than the cost estimates 
without competition (p<0.05, two-tailed t-test). We thus did not confirm hypothesis 1 of 
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our research. 
5.2 Profit margins 
The stated profit margins were in a range between 5% and 20%. Most of the 
participants stated 10% as their ideal profit margin for the described contract. The 
second most common selection for both questionnaires was 15% margin. This is a non-
surprising finding for this set of participants as these are standard profit margins for the 
industrial sector. The results between the two questionnaires did not show a significant 
difference, which means that the stated profit margins were not changed due to the 
introduction of competition to the bidding scenario. Thus, we did not confirm 
hypothesis 2 of our research. 
5.3 Pricing decisions 
The study revealed interesting insights into the impact of competition on the first and 
minimum price bids. The first price bids were not significantly different between the 
two scenarios with the existence of competition. Only a weak statistically significant 
difference was found between the two scenarios (p<0.1, one-tailed t-test). This means 
that we did not confirm hypothesis 3 of our research. The minimum price bids showed 
no difference due to the introduction of competition. We did thus confirm hypothesis 4 
of our research. Comparing price bids to the cost estimates (Section 4.1), a difference 
can be noticed: 11 participants reduced their cost estimate; only six reduced their first 
price bid and five reduced their minimum price bid. On the other hand, only one 
participant raised their cost estimate, five participants raised their first price bid, and six 
raised their minimum price bid. This means that the participants pursued different 
strategies with the different scenarios. Table 3 depicts the reaction of the participants to 
the introduction of competition to the scenario.  
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<Please insert Table 3 about here> 
5.4 Uncertainty at the contract bidding stage 
In general the uncertainty sources identified in our literature review were also 
mentioned by the study participants. The given responses can thus be categorised into 
environmental uncertainty, internal processes for providing the PSS, customer-related 
uncertainty and competition uncertainty as listed in Table 4. Column 3 “frequency 
stated” shows the percentage of the participants who mentioned these uncertainties in 
the presented empirical study. These do not add up to 28 participants or 100%, as the 
question was phrased as an open question and each participant could name as many 
uncertainties as s/he deemed were important. The percentages in Table 4 mark the 
amount that each of the categories was named out of every uncertainty entry. We list 
two columns with frequency values. The first column of frequency values is based on 
the total number of responses for the study participants. The second column of 
frequency values represent the findings excluding the uncertainties listed in the 
questionnaires due to the potential biasing effect. The findings show that the 
uncertainties connected to the internal processes of providing the PSS were considered 
as important by most of the participants. The least important category of this empirical 
study was the uncertainty arising from competition. 
<Please insert Table 4 about here> 
Table 4 shows examples that were named in the scenario descriptions as well as 
independent examples identified by the participants. Each of the named uncertainty 
sources included examples that were independently identified by the participants. 
However, specifically the examples with regard to environmental uncertainty and 
customer-related uncertainty were identified independently by the participants. In other 
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words, the responses mentioning these sources were not biased by the study set-up. We 
can thus summarise that these were very important uncertainty sources for the bidding 
decisions. 
5.5 Additional reduction of price bid 
The additional scenario was to further reduce the price bid (beneath the previously 
named minimum price) when asked by the customer. Most of the participants (71.4%) 
refused a further price reduction in the described scenario. The stated reasons included 
the need to make profit, the too high risk of losses, the argumentation of the previous 
calculation being correct, and the inability to further reduce the uncertainty. The 28.6% 
of participants who stated they would accept a further reduction, argued that they could 
reduce the profit, remove further uncertainties, take the risk of making a loss, the need 
for the cash flow, and to adjust the costs (without an explanation how this could be 
achieved). Table 5 depicts the results of the additional scenario and shows the relative 
importance of these categories. 
<Please insert Table 5 about here> 
6. Discussion 
This section discusses the study findings with regard to the RQ. 
6.1 Pricing of PSS in competitive bidding 
The presented study did not confirm most of the expectations from the literature with 
regard to pricing of PSS in competitive bidding. In particular the findings for the cost 
estimate (hypothesis 1) showed significant differences when competition was 
introduced to the bidding scenario. This contradicts expectations from the literature 
because the costs of fulfilling the PSS requirements do not change due to the existence 
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of competition (Goh et al. 2010). There could be two possible explanations for this 
observation. First, the behavioural considerations are an important factor for decision 
making under uncertainty which change the decision maker’s judgment and evaluations 
of the bidding situation. These behavioural impacts can lead to the observations of 
irrational decision making (Radner 2000, Huang et al. 2013) such as the reductions of 
the cost estimate when competition is introduced to the bidding scenario. The reason for 
such behaviour can be found in the decision maker’s inability to assess the uncertainty 
accurately and consider it in their decision making (Kreye et al. 2012). Second, the 
decision maker may expect that their company needs to reduce the cost of providing the 
PSS over the contract duration through, for example, developing relevant capabilities 
(Reinartz and Ulaga 2008). Thus, the decision maker may expect that the assumptions 
of the cost estimate will not hold over the full duration of the PSS contract and savings 
can be achieved. This suggests that the existence of competition increases pressures on 
providers to reduce their costs which the decision maker includes in their evaluations of 
the pricing decision. Our study findings thus call for behavioural investigations into 
decision making in competitive bidding for PSS including the cognitive processes of the 
decision maker. 
The presented study also did not support hypotheses 2 and 3. This contradicts 
current descriptions of the motivation of competition in bidding as a general reduction 
of the prices (Stark and Rothkopf 1979). The findings may be due to the industrial 
context of the participants. The UK aerospace and defence industry is focused around 
servicing a specific customer which is a government-funded organisation. Thus, the 
customer has relatively high bargaining and negotiation power. The findings suggest 
that the impact of the customer is more important than the existence of competition. 
This would explain the lack of observing any significant difference between the price 
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bids in the bidding scenarios without and with competition. However, a further 
reduction of the price bid was refused by the majority of the study participants. Thus, 
other considerations were also important for the decision makers in our empirical study 
which requires further investigations to identify reasons and causes. 
The findings did confirm hypothesis 4 of our research. Despite the reduction of 
cost estimates, the participants did not reduce the minimum price bid they would accept 
for the PSS. These observations may be due to the nature of the aerospace and defence 
industry which can be described as an oligopoly where few competitors are able to bid 
for the provision of highly complex PSS (Kreye et al. 2013). However, it also links to 
the characteristics of PSS as outlined by the literature which are not homogeneous and 
are thus difficult to be compared between different providers. This observation thus 
suggests that providers retain competitive advantage through the nature of their specific 
PSS offering. This competitive advantage goes beyond the price bid and includes 
quality characteristics (Ellram and Tate 2015, Hawkins et al. 2015) connected to the 
PSS.  
6.2 Uncertainty in pricing PSS 
The findings suggested the role of different uncertainty sources and their importance in 
influencing the decision making of competitive bidding for PSS. Specifically internal 
processes for providing the PSS were the most frequently named source of uncertainty. 
This confirms suggestions from the literature such as Benedettini et al. (2015) and 
Kreye (2017) who describe that most PSS providers who fail in their attempt of 
becoming servitized and do so because of internal risks. Our findings extend the 
literature by linking the internal sources of uncertainty as a main influence to decision 
making in competitive bidding for PSS. This is an important finding because internal 
processes are under the provider’s control (Schmidt and Wei 2006) and can thus be 
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managed and resolved. However, further investigations need to identify how the 
uncertainty arising from different aspects of the internal processes in PSS providers can 
be resolved. 
Specifically, the cost estimate was determined as a major cause of internal 
uncertainty. One of the reasons for this observation may be that the participants were 
cost estimators and bidding decision makers which highlighted their expertise in this 
area. Despite this, the findings also demonstrate the characteristic of PSS as being long-
term commitments and highlights the difficulty of long-term forecasts and future 
uncertainty (Goh et al. 2010). This is a core difference between existing models of 
competitive bidding described in the literature which focus on products or short-term 
services. Thus, PSS form a specific context for competitive bidding. 
Another important source of uncertainty named in the study arose from the 
customer and their utilisation rates of the machine and the uncertainty in future 
contracts and further orders. This observation may again be connected to the specific 
context of the UK aerospace and defence industry because of the high market power of 
the customer. However, this observation also highlights the long-term relationship 
between provider and customer (Dwyer et al. 1987, Kreye et al. 2015) – here considered 
in the form of future contracts and orders. This links to descriptions in the literature that 
describe PSS as requiring close and long-term collaboration between provider and 
customer. The input of the customer creates variability in the production process (Kreye 
2017) and creates additional challenges at the competitive bidding stage. The 
competitive bidding decision can be viewed as one instance within a long-term 
relationship between provider and customer and is impacted by the previous experience 
in this existing relationship (Kreye et al. 2013). Reversely, the future of this relationship 
is also impacted by the decisions made in the competitive bidding process – both 
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positively and negatively. Our research depicts the importance of this uncertainty source 
in comparison to other sources for the decision maker in competitive bidding. 
6.3 Limitations 
The research limitations are related to the nature of the presented empirical study. Our 
study was designed as a closed experiment to investigate the issue of a stand-alone 
decision problem (Saunders et al. 2012). This also includes that the participants were 
excluded from their usual original organisational and political environment and put into 
the laboratory environment of the bidding scenario. Thus, not all possible factors that 
may influence a bidding decision in practice could be studied (Goodwin and Wright 
1993). For example, factors such as the long-term relationship with the customer (Kreye 
2017), the overall political situation in the country or the organisation’s internal politics 
could potentially influence the decision maker’s behaviour. We addressed these 
limitations by including the study within the professional environment of a workshop 
connected with the focus of our research. The participants were experts on the topic of 
cost forecasting and the interpretation of cost forecasts for making pricing decisions 
belonged to their professional work.  
7. Conclusions 
This paper aimed to investigate the research question (RQ): What impact does the 
existence of competition have on the providers’ pricing decision for PSS under 
uncertainty? Presenting insights from an empirical study using an experimental set-up, 
we showed how pricing decisions are impacted through the existence of competition in 
the bidding scenario and the role of uncertainty in this context. Our research offered 
four main insights. First, we found that the evaluation of the cost estimate changed with 
the introduction of competition which contradicts expectations from current theory. 
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Second, we found that profit margins and first price bid do not change with the 
introduction of competition. This also contradicts expectations from theory. Third, the 
minimum stated price bids did not change with the introduction of competition which 
confirms our expectations. Finally, our findings indicate the different sources of 
uncertainty that impact the decision makers’ evaluations and judgment when 
competitive bidding for the provision of PSS. Specifically, the participants named 
internal processes, environmental uncertainty, customer-related uncertainty and 
competition uncertainty as relevant influences on their decision making. 
Our research contributes to the literature in the field in the following two ways. 
First, we present insights in the decision-making at the competitive bidding stage for 
PSS provision. Specifically we showed that predictions from current theory offered only 
limited support within the context of PSS. Reasons for this can be seen in the decision 
maker’s evaluations and judgment under uncertainty which may differ from 
expectations of rationality in the extant literature. Second, we showed the relevant 
uncertainty sources influencing the decision making in competitive bidding. 
Specifically, we identified uncertainty sources that have yet received limited attention 
within the PSS literature. As such, both internal processes of the PSS provider and 
customer-related uncertainty were named as a relevant and important uncertainty 
sources.  
This research offers important managerial implications. First, judgment and 
subjective evaluations were shown to be important in competitive bidding. Thus, the 
decision maker needs to be able to evaluate the high levels of uncertainty they are 
exposed to at this stage in order to identify a suitable price bid and avoid under-pricing 
their offerings. This suggests that relevant decision support tools are needed to identify 
the influencing factors and guide the decision making process. Second, personal 
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characteristics of the bidding decision maker may determine their interpretation of 
uncertainty and hence the chosen price bid. Specifically the ability to judge and evaluate 
available data can impact the decision and ultimately the bidding outcome. Thus careful 
considerations need to be given to the choice of decision maker to avoid systematic bias 
and ensure the success of the service business. 
Our research points towards important areas that need further investigations. 
First, our study pointed towards the importance of internal sources of uncertainty 
connected to the processes for providing the PSS. Examples are the uncertainty 
connected to the cost estimate and the performance of the supported product. Further 
work is needed in investigating these internal sources of uncertainty and developing 
relevant support for PSS providers in responding to them. Second, the pricing decisions 
were found to be influenced by high levels of judgment and subjective evaluations. 
Thus, further work needs to investigate the cognitive processes behind these evaluations 
to identify what factors determine the finding of a suitable price bid. Third, our research 
highlighted the long-term relationship to the customer as an important source of 
uncertainty for PSS providers. This uncertainty source has thus far received limited 
attention in the literature and needs thus further investigation. Specifically the impact of 
the relationship on decision making in pricing and PSS operations is an important area 
for further work. 
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Appendix 
Scenario – no explicit competition (Questionnaire 1): 
“You are the manager in a company producing CNC lathes working in the contract 
department. The company is about to negotiate a service contract with a customer for 
one of the company’s lathes. The graph [Figure 1 in the manuscript] below shows the 
costs that might occur every year during the 5 year service period of Machine A. 
Uncertainty arises for example from variability in labour rates, material prices, 
utilization of the machine and spares storage costs. 
The lower graph labelled 5% equals a 5%-confidence limit that the future costs will be 
these or lower. The equivalent explanation can be given for 30%, 50%, 70% and 95% 
confidence limits. The graph labelled 50% is the baseline estimate derived from typical 
service histories for CNC lathes. The lower graph shows the minimum costs expected to 
occur if only preventive actions i.e. planned maintenance occurs. The upper graph is 
based on the assumption that more than anticipated repairs are encountered in service. 
You are asked to participate in the negotiation process with the customer for a service 
contract for Machine A. You are negotiating a yearly fee for the 5 year service contract. 
You do not have any information on the budget limits of the customer.” 
 
Addition for “competition” scenario (Questionnaire 2): 
“The customer is in negotiation with other contractors for the same contract. It is 
assumed that the competitors have sufficient knowledge in maintaining Machine A 
without the need to contact your company. Your opponents have access to the same cost 
information as you. 
Uncertainties connected to the opponents are: 
 Their bidding strategy, 
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 Their budget limits or price bids, 
 Their overall service budget (including other contracts they have).” 
 
Questions: 
1) What cost estimate would you choose? 
2) Why did you select this? 
3) What profit margin would you add? 
4) What would your first tender be? 
5) What is the minimum price you would bid? 
6) In your opinion, what are the influencing factors on setting this minimum price? 
7) What risks/uncertainties have an influence on your decision? How did they 
impact your decision? 
 
Additional question for “competition” scenario (Questionnaire 2): 
“In the negotiation process you reached your bidding limit, i.e. the lowest you can go to 
maintain your expected profit margins. However, the customer comes back to you 
asking for a price reduction which could mean that at least one opponent has bid lower 
than you, or they have a lower budget. You have the choice of refusing that offer (and 
maybe affront the customer) or lower your bid (e.g. by reducing the profit margin or 
raising the risk to end up with a loss-generating contract).” 
The questions asked about this scenario were: 
1) Would you reduce your bid? 
2) What would be the rationale/explanation for your reaction? 
  
33 
Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Uncertainty influencing the pricing strategy of PSS 
Uncertainty 
sources 
Description Challenge for PSS 
Environmental 
uncertainty 
Uncertainty arising from the external 
environment. It includes factors such as 
market developments (Beckman et al. 
2004), regulatory developments (Goel 
2007) and technology uncertainty 
(Oosterhuis et al. 2011) 
Due to the long contract duration of 
many PSS arrangements (Kreye et al. 
2014), external developments may 
affect PSS providers by reducing the 
operability and profitability. Thus, 
unforeseen market developments can 
challenge operations  
Internal processes 
for providing the 
PSS 
Ability to meet the service requirements 
of the tendered service. Ability to 
accurately forecast the future cost of 
providing the service and 
develop/maintain the relevant 
capabilities 
Includes the performance of the 
product (breakdown rates and 
functionality over the duration of the 
agreement), ability to accurately 
forecast the cost for providing the PSS 
(Goh et al. 2010)  
Customer 
relationship 
Service operations dependent on both 
customer and provider input (Kreye 
2017). Furthermore, the customer 
relationship in B2B settings are impacted 
by the long-term nature of the 
relationships (Grönroos 2011) 
In PSS the nature of the customer 
relationship is different than for 
traditional manufacturing firms 
because of the integrated nature of the 
offering. Previous experience with the 
customer may impact the pricing 
decision (Kreye et al. 2013) 
Competition Existence of competition can create 
uncertainty because they may underbid. 
The uncertainty arises from a lack of 
knowledge about the competitors’ 
capabilities including their cost 
estimates, available technology and 
knowledge and their experience on the 
market (Kreye et al. 2014) 
Can impact the pricing of PSS when 
knowing the identity of typical 
competitors in the specific  bid makes 
pricing strategy easier to determine 
(Ballesteros-Pérez et al. 2016).  
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics on quantitative responses 
Condition Variable Mean Standard 
deviation 
No explicit 
competition 
(Questionnaire 1) 
Cost estimate 
Profit margin 
First price bid (GBP) 
Minimum price bid (GBP) 
68%  
11% 
896 
761 
20.6% 
3.4% 
176.8 
116.3 
Competition 
(Questionnaire 2) 
Cost estimate 
Profit margin 
First price bid (GBP) 
Minimum price bid (GBP) 
59.6% 
10.9% 
835.7 
747.2 
18.6% 
3.5% 
223.7 
134.3 
 
Table 3: Comparison of the pricing strategy between “no explicit competition” and 
“competition” scenarios 
 Reduction Raise Level Most stated values 
First 
price bid 
6 5 13 
No explicit competition 
  £1000 (20.8%) 
  £1200 (12.5%) 
  £900 (12.5%) 
  £700 (12.5%) 
Competition:  £800 (20.8%) 
  £900 (16.7%) 
  £1000 (16.7%) 
Minimum 
price bid 
5 5 14 
No explicit competition 
 : £800 (16.7%) 
  £900 (12.5%) 
  £700 (12.5%) 
Competition: £800 (25.0%) 
  £750 (16.7%) 
  £700 (12.5%) 
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Table 4: Uncertainties in the contract bidding stage 
Uncertainty 
category 
Examples 
Total 
frequency 
Frequency 
excluding 
potentially 
biasing 
examples 
Environmental 
uncertainty 
 Inflation 
 Future trends, economic changes 
 Technology development 
34.2% 34.2% 
Internal processes for 
providing the PSS 
 Inaccuracy of cost forecast and bounds in 
the cost estimate* 
 Uncertainty in cost factors such as labour 
rates and maintenance cost* 
 Performance of the machine, ageing* 
 Risk of equipment failures 
 Level of repairs needed 
55.2% 36.8% 
Customer related 
uncertainty 
 Fluctuations in machine usage including 
peak times and idle time 
 Uncertainty in future contracts and further 
orders 
31.6% 31.6% 
Competition 
uncertainty 
 Uncertainty in competitor 
 Risk of loss of contract* 
 Competitors’ experience with machine 
26.3% 21.0% 
* These examples were named in the questionnaire and may thus have biased the respondents to 
include them in their answers. 
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Table 5: Results of an additional reduction of the price bid 
 
Frequency 
Justification 
Categories 
Percentage 
of 
frequency 
Refusal 71.4% 
 “Make profit”: The own company needed to make profit 
at reasonable risk with this contract. Further reductions 
would lower the profit and thus make the business less 
affordable. 
 “Risk of losses”: Further price reductions would enhance 
the risk of making losses. 
 “Correct calculation”: Some participants argued that 
their previously named minimum price bid was a result of 
correct calculation and thus already includes the possible 
risks that the company could take. Further reductions 
would not be possible. 
 “Uncertainty”: The uncertainty included in the forecast 
and their previous decisions cannot be reduced any 
further. Therefore, the previously stated minimum price 
already includes the minimum compensation for 
uncertainty which cannot be reduced either. 
 Other: Other reasons included the rejection of the price 
reduction was based on the negotiation style. 
35.0% 
 
 
 
25.0% 
 
20.0% 
 
 
 
 
15.0% 
 
 
 
 
5.0% 
Acceptance 28.6% 
 “Reduce profit”: further price reductions can be made 
affordable if the profit margin is reduced, e.g. by 25%. 
 “Remove uncertainty”: reduction of uncertainty involved 
in the scenario. Unfortunately, no examples or methods 
were given. 
 “Take risk”: take higher risk of making losses (without 
monetary compensation). 
 “Cash flow”:  the importance of short term cash flows for 
a company. 
 “Adjust costs”: adjust the cost estimate to justify the 
further price reduction. 
12.5% 
 
12.5% 
 
 
12.5% 
 
25.0% 
 
37.5% 
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Figure 1: Theoretical design and hypotheses 
 
 
Figure 2: Graphical display of cost forecast in the questionnaires 
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